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LAW OF ADVERTISING by GEORGE ERic ROSDEN and PETER E. Ros-
DEN. New York: Matthew Bender. 1974. Two Volumes. $85.00.
Jack R. Bierig*
Ironically, in choosing the title for their two-volume work, The Law of
Advertising, George Eric and Peter Eric Rosden have come close to engag-
ing in false advertising. The title suggests a comprehensive treatise on
the legal considerations relating to the promotion of products, services, and
perhaps ideas. The book, however, offers only an incomplete and inade-
quate treatment of that subject.
Many areas of the law of advertising are entirely omitted. For ex-
ample, the treatise does not discuss how claims made for cosmetics may
cause these products to be regulated as drugs. It ignores the unique ad-
vertising problems of products and services, such as liquor, prescription
drugs, securities and banks, which are regulated by agencies other than
the Federal Trade Commission. It does not take into account such prob-
lems as the use in advertising of flags, stamps and money.
Other important aspects of the law of advertising are not fully de-
veloped. Thus, although the existence of private regulatory bodies is
recognized in chapters 41 and 42, the substantive rules of such bodies are
completely ignored. The rules of the National Association of Broadcasters
dominate the law of radio and television advertising in certain areas, such
as toys, and have a major impact in several other areas. The policies of
the television networks on such subjects as disclosure of warranty terms
are similarly crucial. And yet these rules and policies are simply not dis-
cussed.
Likewise, while lotteries are briefly mentioned at § 17.02, the compli-
cated set of regulations governing these promotional devices is ignored.
When is a promotion a skill contest, and when is it a game of chance?
In which state should sweepstakes be voided? What is the effect of the
statement "void where prohibited?" What filing, disclosure, and winners
list requirements are imposed by various states in connection with sweep-
stakes? The authors leave their readers in the dark.
Very often, the authors set forth rules with almost no analysis. The
paragraph on use of the word "new" (§26.01[51]) is illustrative. The
* Member, Illinois Bar. Associate, Sidley and Austin. Instructor, IIT-Chicago
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entire discussion of the use of "new" to denote a recent product develop-
ment is as follows:
In the term's use regarding a new principle, the question has arisen how
long an advertiser can use the appellation "new". This depends in part
upon the question how large a part of the population has been made ac-
quainted with the new product, process, or principle.
This passage ignores the hard question of how much change in a product
will justify description of the product as "new." Can, for example, a
snack cake previously marketed under one brand name be legitimately
called "new" if it is renamed and marketed in a frozen form which gives
the product a change in taste and texture? The passage does not analyze
the theoretical problems in a rule which forbids use of the word "new"
in one geographical area when the product it describes has only been avail-
able in a distant location. It fails to examine what the rule should be
with respect to a product which, having been test marketed for a year,
is ready to be distributed nationally.
Often, the discussion of an issue is superficial or limited to easy cases.
In discussing the legality of restraints on adjacent broadcast, for example,
the authors state:
Doubtlessly, it is understandable, reasonable and not unfair, if a broadcast-
ing advertiser precludes immediately adjacent competitive advertising. But
if such an agreement goes as far as to forbid competitive advertising for the
entire day, or even for an entire segment of a day, it may constitute an
unfair method of competition (§ 2.03[5][c]).
This formulation succeeds only in avoiding the difficult questions. Sup-
pose an advertiser who purchases time on two telecasts of the World Series
seeks to prevent the advertising of competitive products on all other tele-
casts of the Series on the theory that he wants his product to be the only
one of its kind to be associated with this sports event. The authors in-
genuously tell their readers that section three of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 14, does not apply because it concerns "commodities" and broad-
cast time is not a commodity. But what of the Sherman Act's proscription
of concerted refusals to deal? If the network agrees with the advertiser
not to sell commercial time on any telecast of the World Series for the
promotion of products competitive with those of the advertiser, is the ar-
rangement illegal per se under § 1 of the Sherman Act, or is it subject to
the rule of reason? If it is to be judged by its reasonableness, what result
should be reached? The authors don't offer a clue.
Of course, enactment of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty, Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act of 1975, has made much of the discussion
of warranty law, FTC procedure, and consumer remedies outdated. The
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authors cannot be blamed for this. More serious criticisms, however, can
be made.
Even the most fundamental issues are treated in a superficial fashion.
The requirement that the advertiser and the advertising agency have a
reasonable basis for making a claim before such claim is made appears
almost as an afterthought in a chapter entitled "Procedure 'Before Ad-
ministrative Law Judges." The authors do not consider what constitutes
a "reasonable basis" for different sorts of claims. They omit all mention
of the interplay of such considerations as (1) the specificity of the claim,
(2) the type of product advertised, (3) the possible consequences of a
false claim, (4) the degree of consumer reliance, and (5) the availability
of supporting evidence. They omit this analysis despite the fact that law-
yers are called upon every day to undertake it in order to advise their
clients on what sort of substantiation is required for a specific claim.
In short, the reader is left with the feeling that the portions of the book
which deal with the law of advertising add little to what could be gleaned
from a glance through the CCH Trade Regulation Reporter and the Better
Business Bureau's Do's and Don'ts In Advertising Copy. To be sure,
there are some exceptions. The chapters on the relations between adver-
tiser, agency, and media, chapters 1-3, are helpful, even though they are
somewhat redundant. Likewise, the examination of the standard of per-
ception by which the Federal Trade Commission judges advertising
(§ 18.02) is interesting. But these few worthwhile discussions are not
enough to save the work as a whole. The reader who has been led by
the title of the Rosden treatise to expect a comprehensive analysis of the
law of advertising will be sorely disappointed.
In view of the superficiality and incompleteness of the work, it might
be wondered how the authors fill two complete volumes of text. The an-
swer lies in the fact that much of the book is a rambling and unhelpful
discourse on the federal regulation of the communications media, coupled
with a superficial examination of a variety of subjects only tenuously re-
lated to the law of advertising.
A review of the major portion of the first volume makes clear how the
tome strays from its proclaimed subject. The authors devote all twenty-
three pages of chapter 4, which includes an unnecessary history of the
Commerce Clause, to reaching the conclusion that the federal government
has the power to regulate advertising-as if there had been any question.
They spend the following twenty-eight page chapter in a general discussion
of the first amendment-apparently for those readers who never took a
course in constitutional law. Other than the thought, put off for subse-
quent discussion, that certain forms of corrective advertising might be un-
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constitutional, the chapter's only point relating to advertising is the sugges-
tion that cease and desist orders of the Federal Trade Commission might
,be invalid as prior restraints on speech (§5.04[c]). Can ,the authors be
serious?
Chapter 6 consists of a twenty-page diatribe against Valentine v. Chres-
tensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), in which the Supreme Court indicated that
first amendment protections do not extend to commercial advertising.
While the soundness of this decision is open to serious question,' the case
has remained the law for over three decades. It would seem, therefore,
that a law review article or other form of monograph would be a more
appropriate vehicle for a detailed discussion of the case's continuing va-
lidity than is a general treatise on the law of advertising. In any event,
there is no justification for spending time on the straw arguments that com-
mercial advertising is not constitutionally protected because the first
amendment does not specifically mention advertising and because it is con-
cerned only with political and religious speech (§6.03[1],[2]). Nor is
there justification for the sort of alarmist melodrama contained in the
following passage:
[I]t is a sordid fact that attacks upon the profit incentive eventually must
destroy the free enterprise system, if they are sustained for a sufficiently
long period. This attitude is thus aimed at self-destruction.
This same self-destructive attitude is glaringly obvious in the effects of the
Chrestensen case (§ 6.03[4][a]).
Whatever one may think of the wisdom of Valentine v. Chrestensen, the
experience of the past thirty-three years must demonstrate that the case
has not led to the downfall of commercial advertising or the free enterprise
system.
The next two chapters have virtually nothing to do with advertising.
Chapter 7, entitled "Access to Media," devotes ninety pages in an attempt
to refute the contention that individuals have a right of access to the
media. It includes, inter alia, a discussion of the housing discrimination
cases that originated with Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
(§7.0413]), consideration of the government function cases growing out
of Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (§7.05), a discourse on anti-
trust considerations in the newspaper business, including a history of
American newspapers (§7.06), and the concession that the broadcasting
media are "press" within the meaning of the first amendment. Inclusion
of these matters could perhaps be condoned if they were mentioned in
passing, but ninety pages of such irrelevance is just too much.
1. This is especially true after the decision in Bigelow v. Virginia, 43 U.S.L.W.
4734 (U.S. June 16, 1975).
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Similarly, chapter 8 devotes forty-seven pages to a discussion of the fair-
ness doctrine. It includes a long discussion of whether the licensing of
broadcasters is constitutional (§8.0411] [a]), a consideration of whether
the standard of "public convenience, interest and necessity" is sufficiently
detailed to support Congressional delegation of authority to the Federal
Communications Commission (§8.0411] [b]), and an argument that the
unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) should be overruled (§8.04[2]). Lengthy
discussions of matters long ago settled would be troublesome even if they
were relevant to the purported subject of the treatise. They are inexcus-
able when such matters are beyond the scope of the book.
Chapters 10 through 15 do contain some material relevant to the law
of advertising. Discussion of puffery (§10.06), commercial disparage-
ment by advertising (§13.04), and the impact of advertising on products
liability actions (§14.06) are useful. These sections, however, are sur-
rounded by discussions of unfair competition, palming-off, and trademark
and copyright law, which add nothing to the excellent and comprehensive
treatments of the same subjects in McCarthy on Trademarks and Nimmer
on Copyright. They are lost in generalized and unenlightening discussions
of federal court jurisdiction, the Erie doctrine, conflicts of law, libel and
slander, and products liability in general.
An account of the substance of the text is inadequate, however, to con-
vey the feeling that one takes from this book that the authors are engaging
in little more than an ideological ego trip. Two examples may convey
the tone of the treatise more fully. Referring to the Red Lion case, the
authors state:
Under normal circumstances, it would be an exercise in futility to take is-
sue with a fairly recent and unanimous decision of the Court. However,
the circumstances are not normal. Some of the holdings are merely dicta,
others have subsequently been contradicted by an opinion for the Court or
by some justices, and, finally, some of Red Lion's pronouncements consti-
tute so dire a danger for the Freedom of the Press that detached analysis is
a sine qua non in the national interest (§ 8.04[2]).
Whatever one may think of the Red Lion decision, it is hard to imagine
a dispassionate student of the law seriously suggesting that the case con-
stitutes so dire a threat to first amendment freedoms that the "national in-
terest" requires its re-evaluation--even assuming, contrary to the fact here,
that such re-evaluation would be "detached."
Later, in discussing whether it is deceptive advertising to give an im-
pression that a product feature is unique when in fact the feature is not
unique, the authors exclaim:
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Actionability grounded on allegations of implied uniqueness constitutes a
dangerous tool that could be used for the destruction of the entire advertis-
ing industry (§ 18.03[2]).
Many responsible advertising lawyers have long been counseling their cli-
ents to avoid claims which falsely imply uniqueness. A glance at most
advertising material today will reveal that such claims are generally not
made and in fact need not be made because of the diversity of product
differences. In the case of products in which there is no advertisable dif-
ference or in the case of so-called standardized products, of which there
are far fewer than the authors would have their readers believe, the
emphasis has been on creating pleasant associations with the advertised
product-a perfectly legitimate advertising technique.
These two passages reveal, perhaps more clearly than anything else in
this review, that a more accurate title for The Law of Advertising would
have been A Polemic On Behalf Of Minimizing Federal Regulation Of
The Communications Media In General And Of The Advertising Industry
In Particular. So styled, the book might attract a smaller audience, but
at least one which will not be surprised by its contents. Regardless of title,
however, the comprehensive treatise on the law of advertising in the mid-
1970's remains to be written.
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